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Abstract: For today’s global value chains, seaports and their operations are indispensable components.
In many cases, the cargo handling takes place in close proximity to residential and/or environmentally
sensitive areas. Furthermore, seaports are often not operated by a single organization, but need
to be considered as communities of sometimes hundreds of internal and external stakeholders.
Due to their close cooperation in the cargo handling process, risk management should be a common
approach among the internal stakeholders as well in order to effectively mitigate and respond to
emerging risks. However, empirical research has revealed that risk management is often limited
to the organization itself, which indicates a clear lack of cooperation. Primary reasons in this
regard are missing knowledge about the relations and responsibilities within the port and differing
terminologies. Therefore, we propose an ontology (CoRiMaS) that implements a developed reference
model for risk management that explicitly aims at seaports with a cooperative approach to risk
management. CoRiMaS has been designed looking at the Semantic Web and at the Linked Data
model to provide a common interoperable vocabulary in the target domain. The key concepts of
our ontology comprise the hazard, stakeholder, seaport, cooperation aspect, and risk management
process. We validated our ontology by applying it in a case study format to the Port of Hamburg
(Germany). The CoRiMaS ontology can be widely applied to foster cooperation within and among
seaports. We believe that such an ontological approach has the potential to improve current risk
management practices and, thereby, to increase the resilience of operations, as well as the protection
of sensitive surrounding areas.
Keywords: cooperation; ontology; risk management; seaport
1. Introduction
Seaports are important logistical nodes for global trade. In 2018 only, a total of 11,002 million tons
of goods were loaded for international seaborne trade, including crude oil, petroleum products, gas,
main bulks, such as iron ore, grain, and coal, as well as other dry cargo [1]. This amount of goods
handled has been increasing constantly throughout the last decades. Consequently, seaports play an
essential role in the logistical chain, as all seaborne trade has to pass through their facilities, where
the transport mode is changed from a water to a land based one (or vice versa). Seaports are often
located in densely populated areas, meaning that dangerous and non-dangerous goods are loaded and
unloaded in close proximity to sensitive urban environments. In Germany for instance, according to
the Federal Office of Statistics, 44.5 million tons have been transported by sea and 47.3 million tons on
inland waterways in 2017 [2]. These volumes are handled at ports and represent combined about 31%
of the total amount of dangerous goods transported.
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Risk management, including its proactive and reactive measures, is vital for ensuring safe and
secure operations within the seaports. This was demonstrated, for example, by an incident on board of
the “CCNI AURACO”, a mega container ship, which caught fire in 2016 after an explosion at the dock
at the Port of Hamburg, Germany. During welding work onboard the ship, a container exploded and
the fire spread to nearby units, causing thick smoke covering both the vessel and terminal. As the crew
was not able to extinguish the flames, they had to request assistance from local authorities. The fire
extinguishing process involved 150 firefighters, several machines, and extensive equipment [3]. In total,
it took the emergency response team almost four days to eliminate the threat as the temperature inside
the ship was extremely high, causing severe damage to the ship’s stability (Fire on Container Ship
CCNI Arauco Was Extinguished—Maritme Harold [Online], http://www.maritimeherald.com/2016/
fire-on-container-ship-ccni-arauco-was-extinguished/. Accessed: 8 January 2019) and disrupting
operations at the terminal for significant time. Even after the fire services completed their work, the
affected berths remained closed due to police investigation and clean-up work (Burchardkai: Fire on
“CCNI Arauco” Extinguished—HHLA [Online], https://hhla.de/en/2016/09/burchardkai-fire-on-
ccni-arauco-extinguished.html. Accessed: 8 January 2019). The incident so severe that emergency
services personnel from other cities had to be requested by the local authorities in Hamburg in order
to get the critical situation under control (Photos: Container Ship in Hamburg Harbor Still Burns—The
Maritime Executive [Online], https://www.maritime-executive.com. Accessed: 8 January 2019).
The case described is only one example of many and of the possible risks that could endanger
lives, environment, infrastructure as well as operations within and round the seaport. According to
the European Maritime Safety Agency [4], about 50% of all marine casualties and incidents took place
in ports or their nearby areas (see Figure 1). In 2017 alone, more than 1700 events were registered in
European port areas or involving European ships in port areas overseas. The data reported in the
figure also indicates that from 2011 to 2014, the total amount of casualties and incidents has risen.
That high level has not decreased ever since. During this period, the proportion of events in ports
and their nearby areas has also increased to about half of the total. Considering this development,
ports and their immediate surroundings are—compared to coastal waters, the open sea, and inland
waters—affected most frequently and require, therefore, special attention in order to improve safety
and security.
In addition, the case shows that usually many parties or stakeholders in a seaport have to be
involved in the process of risk management in order to reduce the occurrence probability and impact
severity in an effective manner. Establishing a thorough risk management in a seaport requires, hence,
an extensive and reliable cooperation between many organizations.
Even though risk management is gaining a greater importance and is receiving increasing attention
in seaports, standard procedures that are universally applicable do not exist. In fact, risk management
activities are currently very port and stakeholder specific [5]. This also represents a great barrier
for cooperative activities in risk management, which are necessary in order to mitigate the effects of
hazards and resulting risks as demonstrated by the above reported CCNI AURACO incident. It is,
therefore, our first objective to design a suitable model for cooperative risk management that helps
practitioners and researchers to develop a common understanding, how risk management among
independent organizations should be carried out.
In order to have our model working in practice within and among the diverse organizations,
we provide an ontology [6], understood like a formal conceptualization of a domain, to allow (i) the
effective description and re-use of risk management activities and environments; (ii) the analysis
of current strategies for specific risks across relevant stakeholders; as well as (iii) their evolution,
alignment, and optimization. In addition, the ontology will enable comparisons among different
seaports, for example with respect to the applied methods or stakeholder structure. In general,
the formalization is expected to define a risk management framework within and across seaports.
The considered categories, attributes, and relations strive to reduce the complexity and to organize
the different concepts of risk management in seaports in a suitable way, such that the process is
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supported and its practicability increased. The developed framework is generic in nature and may be
applied to any seaport as well as used by any organization willing to leverage its risk management
activities, shaping the overall risk landscape positively.
Figure 1. Distribution of marine casualties and incidents by location.
1.1. An Ontological Approach to Establish a Common Language for Cooperative Risk Management
The benefits introduced by the adoption of ontologies have been extensively discussed in literature,
in general terms [6] or in the context of specific application domains (e.g., recently in Software
Engineering [7].
Those advantages can be summarized in the following points:
• Formal Specifications and Analysis. Ontology allows a formal unambiguous specification of a given
conceptualization [8]. That is a basic but critical feature as, if properly adopted, ontology may
limit the risk of misinterpretation. At the same time, a formal conceptualization provides an ideal
analysis framework [6].
• Interoperability, Integration, Re-use, and Portability. Assuming computational ontologies [8]
implemented in a standard language, the resulting data model becomes a kind of potentially
interoperable data structure that enables data integration and re-use as many studies (e.g., [9])
clearly show.
• SW-enabled data infrastructure. If ontologies are developed upon Semantic Web technology, then
they are intrinsically enabled in the Semantic Web [10]. It allows for an effective implementation
of Linked Data philosophy [11], as well as a global understanding of knowledge bases facilitated
by an improved interoperability model (known as Semantic Interoperability [12]).
• Inference and Automatic Reasoning. Ontology assumes knowledge at different levels. Indeed,
grounded knowledge is defined by explicit “statements”, while inference rules and structures
provides a further level of knowledge. As inference rules and structures are also defined by
adopting standard languages and they are part of ontologies, the inference process, commonly
known as reasoning, is implemented by standard components (reasoners). It results in standard
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automatic reasoning, as different independent systems interpret a given ontology in the same
way. Automatic reasoning is a key feature within knowledge-based systems. For instance, in the
context of this work, inference may support processes for consistency checking.
Informally, rather then a prescriptive approach, ontology provides a “common language” that
can be dynamically extended and linked to others. Our previous work (Current Status of Risk
Management Process at Major Baltic Sea Region Seaports: An Interview Study, https://blogit.utu.fi/
hazard/publications/) has clearly shown that the missing “common language” is a major obstacle
for cooperative risk management in seaports today. As discussed later on in the paper, our ontology
expresses high-level semantics. Therefore, such a language is directly usable by end-users. At the same
time, the ontology is developed upon Semantic Web Technology, so it is machine-interpretable.
1.2. Structure of the Paper
In Section 2, we discuss works related to this research. The analysis predominantly focuses
on the current state of risk management in seaports and on existing models for risk management.
Then, in Section 3, we introduce the reference model (CoRiMaS) developed for cooperative risk
management in seaports. The model visualizes informally key relations among the organizations and
their surroundings within the field studied. On the one hand, the intention is to also allow non-experts
to understand the dynamics and motives in risk management; on the other hand, the model lays
out the foundation for the ontology developed in the subsequent section. Section 4 deals with the
description of the proposed ontology. Section 5 includes the case study of the Port of Hamburg,
being the third largest seaport in Europe. The full description of the Port of Hamburg from a risk
management perspective is out of the scope of the paper and, indeed, only a very minor subset of
concepts is reported. Section 6 provides a brief overview of different possible ways to use the ontology
in practice. The paper ends with a conclusion section in which future work is briefly discussed too.
2. Related Work
In this section, we provide a concise analysis and a brief discussion of existing works. As an
exhaustive overview of solutions, issues, and challenges related to generic risk management is out of
the scope of the paper, we focus uniquely on seaports (Section 2.1). Additionally, we present, in short,
a review of ontology-based solutions to risk management (Section 2.2).
2.1. Risk Management and Seaports
Due to the vast amount of hazards and risk sources in seaports, an efficient and effective risk
management is gaining further importance [13]. The research on risk management in seaports has a
wide scope and covers several different aspects such as risk factors [14–17], risk assessment [18–22],
natural hazards [23–25], management of disruptions [26], disaster response planning [27], empirical
data [28], and frameworks [29].
In some cases (i.e., [14,19]), the contributing authors develop very specific approaches only
applicable to particular ports. In most cases, however, the concepts and methods proposed are quite
generic and may be applied to different types of (sea)ports.
In a recent co-citation analysis, the current state of risk management research in seaports was
examined [5]. The authors identified eight clusters based on a structured approach. The study revealed
that there is a clear gap concerning cooperative risk management in seaports with no developed
theoretical or empirical models. The current research focuses on approaches and studies for analysis
and decision-making, as well as studies related to the impacts of natural hazards on coastal and port
areas. Minor research areas, such as assessment methods for hazardous spills, ballast water, and
liquefied natural gas (LNG) were also identified.
As organizations are closely interwoven in their operations and are located in close proximity to
each other, the area of cooperative risk management is of a particular importance. Only if proactive
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and reactive activities are well aligned and knowledge is shared among the relevant organizations,
can a thorough risk management process be guaranteed. This research aims to address the above
mentioned gap by applying an ontology-based approach. We believe that it can be an additional
value for the quality risk management in complex systems because, by providing a descriptive formal
conceptualization of the target domain, such an approach may integrate existing strategies and
methods to facilitate an unambiguous use of the framework within computer systems in a context of
interoperability.
2.2. Ontology for Risk Management
Ontologies are extensively used within the risk management domain and, indeed, a number
of contributions may be easily identified in literature. They often refer to relatively generic
applications, such as improving risk analysis [30] and supporting risk management processes [31].
Other contributions address much more specific sub-domains, i.e., risk management in construction
projects [32] and information security [33]. Many solutions deal with specific problems, for instance job
hazard analysis [34] and scenario-based evaluation [35] and risk management in small-medium sized
enterprises [36]. Often ontology-based systems focus on a given hazard category, such as geographical
hazards [37].
The ontology proposed implements our reference model for risk management which explicitly
aims at seaports with a collaborative approach to risk management. Semantic technology allows the
alignment with other ontologies in the domain of risk management, as well as with upper vocabularies
to establish an integrated knowledge environment.
3. CoRiMaS: A Reference Model to Risk Management in Seaports
In general, a seaport can be defined as “the place of the change of means of transport from
inland into a water bound one” [38] as well as the place of the transshipment from ship to ship.
Seaports thereby represent very important logistical nodes for many industries. Due to this importance,
smooth and safe operations without severe emergencies and accidents are in the interest of all
organizations that are linked directly or indirectly to the seaport. Furthermore, seaports are often
located near, or even in, densely populated areas and natural habitats that must be protected and
preserved. A proper risk management within and across the involved organizations is the key to
achieve these objectives. In particular, the cooperative component is a challenge for many actors in a
seaport but nonetheless a substantial part of a preventive and reactive risk management that needs to
be further enhanced.
The reference model—CoRiMaS—developed for cooperative risk management is shown in
Figure 2. It helps to generate a common, yet informal, understanding of this complex matter.
In such a model, risk and hazard are closely linked to each other. Hazard can represent any
physical or chemical condition that has the potential to cause a damage to people, property, or the
environment [39]. An example of a hazard is a pressurized tank containing a large quantity of ammonia.
Hazards can be classified from several perspectives. According to their origin, hazards can be divided
into natural and man-made hazards [40]. Natural hazards are adverse events that arise from the
occurring processes, which exist in the natural environment such as floods or earthquakes. Man-made
hazards represent any intentional or non-intentional actions caused by humans that have the potential
to cause damage to others or physical infrastructure.
The different hazard and/or types influence the assessment process of the potential risks that
could arise. The core dimensions that characterize a particular risk are its occurrence probability and
its consequence. Risk occurrence probability quantifies the likelihood of occurrence of a specific event
that is caused by a potential hazard [39]. Risk consequence measures the severity or expected effects an
event’s outcome can have [39]. For instance, an ammonia cloud travelling at a certain velocity and
direction is likely to injure a definite number of people. A data collection process is required to make a
better estimation of the risk occurrence probability and risk consequence. For instance, the estimation
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can be based on the amount of ammonia released in kilogram per second and the wind speed in
kilometres per hour.
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Figure 2. Reference model for cooperative risk management in seaports (CoRiMaS).
As mentioned before, a seaport is a complex community of several internal and external
stakeholders [41,42] that could be affected, directly or indirectly, by the risks resulting from man-made
or natural hazards. Since the stakeholders are often located in close proximity and premises are
frequently adjacent to each other, the importance of smooth and safe operations in the seaport as a
whole is further underlined. Consequently, it is inevitable to cooperate with other organizations with
respect to risk management and the counter measures adopted hereby. The legal framework defines
the regulations that the actors in a seaport are obliged to follow. In some cases, these regulations even
demand appropriate actions to prevent or respond to risks.
In general, a process can be defined as a “set of interrelated or interacting activities that use inputs
to deliver an intended result” (Quality management systems, EN ISO 9000:2005, 2005). In case of
the risk management process, these activities can be grouped into sequential phases of identifying,
analysing, evaluating, and treating different types of risks. How these phases are executed in detail, is
documented in standards, such as the ISO 31000 (Risk Management, ISO 31000:2009(E), 2009) or the
AS/NZS 4360:2004 [43]. In a seaport, the internal stakeholders conduct risk management activities
and the external stakeholders benefit from the adopted counter measures, as the consequences of the
overall risk landscape are mitigated.
A method in risk management can be qualitative, semi-quantitative, or quantitative.
These methods can be applied in either one or multiple phases of the risk management process.
As qualitative methods are simpler but more subjective, quantitative methods are more objective but
require substantial data and analysis. Semi-quantitative methods combine the aspects of quantitative
and qualitative approaches. A countermeasure is necessary to reduce the occurrence probability
and/or consequences of the corresponding risk [43].
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4. CoRiMaS Ontology
As previously introduced, this section focuses on a formal specification of the proposed
cooperative model by adopting Semantic Web technology as per W3C (World Wide Web
Consortium—https://www.w3.org) standards. This formal specification is used to convert the
informal model into a set of classes, relationships, and attributes defined according to a standard
ontology language. It allows for the unambiguous use of the framework in practice, as well as enabling
the resulting data structure within computer systems.
CoRiMaS ontology was designed by looking at the Semantic Web [10] and at the Linked Data
model [11]. It was developed upon semantic technology (Ontology Web Language—OWL 2 [44]) with
the support of Protege [45]. The ontology is freely available under the Creative Commons Attribution
4.0 International License. Main classes, object, and data properties are listed in Tables 1–4, respectively.
We checked the consistency of the ontology within Protege by using inference engines available
in such an environment, i.e., HermiT [46]. We also performed the same process outside Protege; for
instance, the ontology may be visualized by WebVOWL [47], which implements VOWL [48] and
builds ontological visualizations by processing Resource Description Framework Schema (RDF-S) [49]
inference rules, including rdfs:domain/rdfs:range extensively adopted in our implementation. We do
not specify the type of the attributes in our visualizations. We refer to them generically as “literals”,
according to the typical terminology adopted within the Semantic Web community. Last but not least,
the ontology was tested within the knowledge-based system currently under development at the
University of Technology, Sydney. This environment is based on Pellet [50] and uses ARQ [51] as a
SPARQL (https://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-query/) wrapper to support query functionalities.
A core set of internal concepts, representing the underlining model, is depicted in Figure 3.
This diagram provides a concise overview of the ontology. The diagram adopted for the visual
representation is a knowledge graph derived from the language adopted (OWL). The same approach
was followed to describe more detailed structures or examples of use in other parts of the paper.
According to this simplified view, the target environment is understood as a composition resulting
from the specification of seaports and hazards, which are represented by the corresponding ontological
concepts (CoRiMaS:SeaPort and CoRiMaS:Hazard). A seaport is understood and, therefore described,
as a virtual organization (CoRiMaS:VirtualOrganization) resulting from the coexistence of several
different stakeholders (CoRiMas:Stakeholder) and their interactions. The key concept, which connects
the different aspects of the model all together is the co-operation aspect (CoRiMaS:CooperationAspect in
the ontology) that involves stakeholders in a given risk management process (CoRiMaS:Process).
CoRiMaS ontology provides a number of hierarchically organised classes. They represent the
types that the different concepts may be associated with. This structure is extensible by definition,
so new types may be provided, and can also be merged with classes from other vocabularies. However,
depending on the context, on the target system, and on the kind of user, providing new classes can
lead to some issues, including unmanaged duplications, inconsistencies, and overlapping. In order to
allow a dynamic extension of taxonomies without the need to define new classes, the ontology enables
the specification of types as instances (OWL individuals) of generic class types that are eventually
associated with the target concept. Examples are provided in the next section.
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Table 1. Main classes description.
Class Description
Hazard A chemical or physical condition that has the potential for causing damage to
people, to property, or to the environment [39].
Risk A measure of human injury, environmental damage or economic loss in terms
of both the incident likelihood and the magnitude of the loss or injury [39].
Natural_Hazard Ordinary occurring process which exists in the natural environment [40,52].
Man-made_Hazard Intentional or unintentional actions that have a potential to cause harm to
people or organizations [40].
Stakeholder Person or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive themselves to
be affected by a decision or activity a.
Actor Synonymous with Stakeholder.
Player Synonymous with Stakeholder.
Internal_Stakeholder Stakeholders who directly engage in the various daily activities at the seaport
(definition based on [41,53]).
External_Stakeholder Stakeholders who do not directly engage in the various daily activities at the
seaport but are dependent and/or effected by the activities of the seaport’s
internal stakeholders (definition based on [41,53]).
StakeholderCategory Category associated with stakeholders.
VirtualOrganization A network of organizations that share resources and skills to achieve its
mission/goal. It is not limited to an alliance of enterprises [54,55].
SeaPort The place of the change of means of transport from an inland into a
water-bound one [38].
PortType The port type characterizes the port according to different dimensions, such as
location or water access.
PortFeature A port feature indicates a characteristic of the port, such as available terminals
or hinterland connections.
PortLocation It defines the geographical position of a seaport.
Legal_Framework The legal framework includes all respective national laws and regulations d.
CooperationAspect A particular part or feature of the overall cooperation among stakeholders.
CooperationAspectIntensity The intensity of the corresponding cooperation aspect, e.g., the intensity of
communication between two stakeholders with regards to operational risks.
Process A set of interrelated or interacting activities that use inputs to deliver an
intended result b.
ProcessPhase A distinct period or stage in a series of events or a process of change or
development c.
PhaseActivity A phase activity comprises a set of actions that deliver an intended result to
the corresponding phase. For instance, in the risk treatment phase, the activity
of defining suitable counter measures comprises actions such as organizing
workshops or collecting expert estimates.
RM-Method An elaborated approach that can be used to identify, analyse, evaluate, handle
and/or monitor risks [56].
Measure A counter measure is implemented in the process of risk treatment to modify
risk. A counter measure can be either proactive or reactive.
Proactive Creating or controlling a situation rather than just responding to it after it has
happened c.
Reactive Acting in response to a situation rather than creating or controlling it c.
a International Standard ISO 31000:2009(E), S. 4; b ISO Standard EN ISO 9000:2005, S. 18; c Oxford
Dictionary; d Wolke (2017)—Risk Management, ISBN: 978-3110440522.
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Table 2. Semantic structure of the main classes composing the ontology.
Class Sub-Class Disjoint Equiv.
Hazard - - Risk
Risk - - Hazard
Natural_Hazard Hazard Man-made_Hazard -
Man-made_Hazard Hazard Natural_Hazard -
Stakeholder - StakeholderCategory Actor, Player
Actor - - Stakeholder
Player - - Stakeholder
Internal_Stakeholder Stakeholder External_Stakeholder -
External_Stakeholder Stakeholder Internal_Stakeholder -
StakeholderCategory - Stakeholder -
VirtualOrganization - - -
SeaPort VirtualOrganization PortType -
PortType - SeaPort -
PortFeature - - -
PortLocation - - -
Legal_Framework - - -
CooperationAspect - - -
CooperationAspectIntensity - - -
Process - ProcessPhase, PhaseActivity -
ProcessPhase - Process, PhaseActivity -
PhaseActivity - ProcessPhase, Process, RM-Method -
RM-Method - PhaseActivity -
Measure - - -
Proactive - - -
Reactive - - -
CoRiMaS: Hazard
CoRiMaS: 
CooperationAspect
CoRiMaS: Stakeholder
CoRiMaS: SeaPort
CoRiMaS: Actor CoRiMaS: Player
CoRiMaS: Risk
CoRiMaS: relatedToHazard
CoRiMaS: relatedToStakeholder
CoRiMaS: composedOf
CoRiMaS: composes
owl: equivalentClass
owl: equivalentClass
CoRiMaS: relatedCooperationAspect
CoRiMaS: aspectRelatedTo
CoRiMaS:
InternalStakeholder
CoRiMaS:
VirtualOrganization
CoRiMaS: 
Process
rdfs: subClassOf
CoRiMaS:
ExternalStakeholder
rdfs: subClassOf
CoRiMaS: hasInterest
CoRiMaS: relatedToProcess
owl: disjointWith
CoRiMaS: contributes
Class
Object Property
Equivalent class
Disjoint class
Inverse properties
Equivalent properties
Figure 3. CoRiMaS ontology overview.
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Table 3. Main object properties.
Property Sub-Prop. Funct. Equiv. Inverse Domain Range
aspectRelatedTo - no - relatedToCooperationAspect CooperationAspect -
relatedToCooperationAspect - no - aspectRelatedTo - CooperationAspect
relatedToCooperationAspectIntensity aspectRelatedTo yes - - CooperationAspect CooperationAspectIntensity
relatedToHazard aspectRelatedTo no - - CooperationAspect Hazard
relatedToProcess aspectRelatedTo yes - - CooperationAspect Process
relatedToProcessPhase aspectRelatedTo no - - CooperationAspect ProcessPhase
relatedToStakeholder aspectRelatedTo no - - CooperationAspect Stakeholder
has_measure - no - - - Measure
hasFeature - no - - SeaPort PortFeatures
legal_framework - no - - SeaPort Legal_Framework
portProperty - no - - - -
composedOf portProperty no - composes Internal_Stakeholder SeaPort
composes portProperty no - composedOf SeaPort Internal_Stakeholder
contributes portProperty no hasInterest - external_Stakeholder SeaPort
hasInterest portProperty no contributes - external_Stakeholder SeaPort
hasPortLocation portProperty no - - SeaPort PortLocation
hasPortType portProperty no - - SeaPort PortType
hasStakeholderCategory - no - - Stakeholder StakeholderCategory
process_structure - no - - - -
belongs_to_process process_structure no - composedOf_ProcessPhase ProcessPhase Process
composedOf_ProcessPhase process_structure no - belongs_to_process Process ProcessPhase
phase_activity process_structure no - - ProcessPhase PhaseActivity
previous_phase process_structure no - - ProcessPhase ProcessPhase
rm-method process_structure no - - ProcessPhase RM-Method
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Table 4. Main data properties.
Property Sub-Property of Functional Domain
risk_property - no Hazard
risk_consequence risk_property yes Hazard
risk_occurrenceProbability risk_property yes Hazard
cooperationAspectIntensity - yes CooperationAspect
portAttribute - no SeaPort
hinterlandConnection portAttribute no SeaPort
portTerminal portAttribute no SeaPort
waterCondition portAttribute no SeaPort
weatherCondition portAttribute no SeaPort
4.1. Hazard
A hazard is specified in CoRiMaS according to the subset of the ontology proposed in Figure 4
by using either the internal concept CoRiMaS:Hazard or CoRiMaS:Risk. The ontology provides
a specific extendible taxonomy to properly classify hazards. The current version is based on
the key difference between a natural hazard (CoRiMaS:Natural_Hazard in the ontology) and a
man-made hazard (corresponding to the internal concept CoRiMaS:Man-made_Hazard). As reported
in the diagram, a further class break down allows for a fine grained classification. Each hazard
may be characterized properly by specifying its attributes (e.g., CoRiMaS:risk_occurrenceProbability
and CoRiMaS:risk_consequence) and related to cooperation aspects through the internal property
CoRiMaS:relatedToHazard.
CoRiMaS: Hazard
CoRiMaS: Risk
owl: equivalentClass
CoRiMaS: Natural_Hazard CoRiMaS: Man-made_Hazard
CoRiMaS: 
CooperationAspect
CoRiMaS: relatedToHazard Literal
CoRiMas: risk_consequence
(functional)
rdfs: subClassOf
owl: disjointWith
rdfs: subClassOf
rdfs: subClassOf
CoRiMaS: Geophysical_Hazard
CoRiMaS: Hydrological_Hazard
CoRiMaS: Metrological_Hazard
owl: 
disjointWith
CoRiMaS: 
Intentional_Hazard
CoRiMaS: 
Unintentional_Hazard
CoRiMas: risk_occurrenceProbability
(functional)
Literal
Figure 4. Hazard specification in CoRiMaS.
4.2. Stakeholder
A stakeholder can be defined within the ontology as a member of one of the equivalent classes
CoRiMaS:Stakeholder, CoRiMaS:Actor, and CoRiMaS:Player (Figure 5). For stakeholders, the ontology
provides a taxonomy for a proper classification from a risk management point of view. The model
explicitly distinguished between internal and external stakeholders, represented by the corresponding
ontological concepts CoRiMaS:InternalStakeholder and CoRiMaS:ExternalStakeholder. Apart from their
involvement in the seaport, the most relevant semantic relationship involving stakeholders is the one
to cooperation aspects (CoRiMaS:relatedToStakeholder). Typical attributes associated with institutions
and individuals may be specified by using external vocabularies (e.g., vCard Ontology [57]).
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CoRiMaS: 
CooperationAspectCoRiMaS: Stakeholder
CoRiMaS: Actor CoRiMaS: Player
CoRiMaS: relatedToStakeholder
owl: equivalentClass
CoRiMaS:
InternalStakeholder
CoRiMaS:
ExternalStakeholder
rdfs: subClassOf
owl: disjointWith
CoRiMaS:
StakeholderCategory
CoRiMaS: hasStakeholderCategory
CoRiMaS: 
StakeholderCategory_byRole
CoRiMaS: 
StakeholderCategory_byPosition
CoRiMaS: 
StakeholderCategory_byType
owl: 
disjointWith
rdfs: subClassOf
owl: disjointWith
CoRiMaS: Private_Company
CoRiMaS: Authority
owl: 
disjointWith
rdfs: subClassOf
CoRiMaS: Economic_direct
CoRiMaS: Economic_indirect
CoRiMaS: 
Academic_and_Community
CoRiMaS: Legislation_and_Public
owl: 
disjointWith
CoRiMaS: Government
rdfs: subClassOf
rdfs: subClassOf
Figure 5. Stakeholder definition in CoRiMaS.
4.3. Seaport
As previously mentioned, a seaport is understood as a virtual organization (Figure 6) composed
of a number of internal stakeholders that play an active role. Such a composition is stated by adopting
the property CoRiMaS:composedOf. External stakeholders, which have some interest or are indirectly
related to the port activities, may be associated with a given seaport by using one of the two equivalent
properties CoRiMaS:hasInterest and CoRiMaS:contributes. As shown in Figure 6, a seaport may be
characterised from a risk management perspective according to the CoRiMaS model with the support
of a number of data and object properties. Although a detailed description of the specification is out of
the scope of the paper, an example will be provided later on in the paper.
CoRiMaS: SeaPort
CoRiMaS: composedOf
CoRiMaS: composes
CoRiMaS:
InternalStakeholder
CoRiMaS:
VirtualOrganization
rdfs: subClassOf
CoRiMaS:
ExternalStakeholder
CoRiMaS: hasInterest
owl: disjointWith
CoRiMaS: contributes
CoRiMaS: PortFeature
CoRiMaS: 
HinterlandConnections_Feature
CoRiMaS: Terminals_Feature
CoRiMaS: Location_Feature
rdfs: subClassOf
CoRiMaS: hasFeature
CoRiMaS: PortLocationCoRiMaS: Region
rdfs: subClassOf
CoRiMaS: hasPortLocation
CoRiMaS: 
Legal_Framework
CoRiMaS: hasLegalFramework
CoRiMaS: PortType
CoRiMaS: hasPortType
owl: disjointWith
CoRiMaS: 
LocationType
CoRiMaS: 
SpecializationType
CoRiMaS: 
WaterAccessType
CoRiMaS: 
OrganizationType
rdfs: subClassOf
Literal
CoRiMas: waterCondition
Literal
CoRiMas: weatherCondition
Literal
Literal
CoRiMas: portTerminal
CoRiMas: hinterlandConnection
owl: disjointWith
owl: disjointWith
Figure 6. Seaport description in CoRiMaS.
4.4. Cooperation Aspect
As previously discussed in the paper, the cooperation aspect is the central concept in the
CoRiMaS model and it is explicitly represented within the ontology by the CoRiMaS:CooperationAspect.
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The ontological description of a cooperation aspect (Figure 7) reflects its original semantics and, indeed,
it is related to target hazards (CoRiMaS:relatedToHazard), to the process established to manage such
hazards (CoRiMaS:relatedToProcess) and to the stakeholder involved (CoRiMaS:relatedToStakeholder).
Generic associations of internal/external concepts with a cooperation aspect may be established
through the inverse pair of functions (see OWL specifications [44]) CoRiMaS:aspectRelatedTo and
CoRiMaS:relatedCooperationAspect. Finally, further characterizations may be established by using the
internal vocabulary or external ones.
CoRiMaS: 
CooperationAspect
CoRiMaS: Stakeholder CoRiMaS: relatedToStakeholder
CoRiMaS: 
Process
CoRiMaS: relatedToProcess
(functional)
CoRiMaS: relatedCooperationAspect
CoRiMaS: aspectRelatedTo
CoRiMaS: ProcessPhase
CoRiMaS: relatedToProcessPhase
CoRiMaS: belongs_to_process
CoRiMaS: composedOf_ProcessPhaseCoRiMaS: previous_phase
CoRiMaS: RM-Method
CoRiMaS: rm-method
CoRiMaS: RM-Method_SemiQuantitative
rdfs: subClassOf
CoRiMaS: Hazard
CoRiMaS: relatedToHazard
CoRiMaS: RM-Method_Quantitative
CoRiMaS: RM-Method_Qualitative
CoRiMaS: RM-
Method_Quantitative_Simulationbased
CoRiMaS: RM-
Method_Quantitative_Mathematical
rdfs: subClassOf
CoRiMaS:
CooperationAspectIntensity
CoRiMaS: 
relatedToCoperationAspectIntensity
(functional)
Literal
CoRiMas: cooperationAspectIntensity
(functional)
CoRiMaS: PhaseActivity
CoRiMaS: phase_activity
Figure 7. Specification of a cooperation aspect and related process in CoRiMaS.
4.5. Process
The use of ontology to describe general processes (e.g., [58]) or workflows (e.g., [59]) is quite
common and extensively reported in literature. For instance, ontology-based semantic annotations
may aim at establishing semantic interoperability among the different models [12], as well as at a re-use
of components [60]. Likewise, ontology may describe domain-specific processes such as, among others,
software processes [61], business processes [62], assembly processes [63], and relational processes [64].
We adopted an ad-hoc approach to provide a domain-specific concise description of risk
management processes. These processes (CoRiMaS:Process) are understood as a sequence of phases
(CoRiMaS:ProcessPhase). Each phase is associated with one or more risk management methods
(CoRiMaS:RM-Method) and multiple activities (CoRiMaS:PhaseActivity) as defined in Tables 1 and 2.
The ontology includes a taxonomy for risk management methods that distinguishes between
qualitative, quantitative, and semi-quantitative methods.
5. A Case Study: The Port of Hamburg
As a case study, we refer to the Port of Hamburg (https://www.hafen-hamburg.de/en/). We first
describe the current approach, focusing on generic risk management practices and limitations. Then,
we provide some examples of practical use of the ontology within that context emphasizing on the
added value provided.
5.1. Current Risk Management Systems and Practices at Port of Hamburg
One of the most important difficulties that stakeholders have when dealing with risk management
at seaports is the lack of a standard process. Such a standard approach should be customized to tackle
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different risk sources. For instance, at the Port of Hamburg, every stakeholder follows a different
approach to deal with natural and man-made hazards.
Furthermore, due to this stakeholder-specific focus, roles and responsibilities for risk management
are neither documented nor accessible for other stakeholders, especially for small and medium size
companies. Assuming this kind of setup, cooperation is quite difficult as, at least in general, there
is no central management and coordination of the different activities. Only some core stakeholders
including authorities, shipping companies, and terminal operators implement some cooperation based
on leadership, coordination, and consultations. However, the cooperation aspects carried out by these
stakeholders are not always clearly defined and linked to specific processes and hazards.
As explained in the introductory part, the ontology object of this paper aims at establishing
a common dynamic language to define a cooperative approach to risk management in seaports.
Such a support is expected to facilitate analysis at any stage and to provide semantic linkage
among responsible stakeholders, examined hazards, cooperation aspects, and the corresponding
risk management processes. As shown in the next subsection, the complex scenario may be easily
described through a formal specification supported by an extensible taxonomy and a set of relationships
among concepts.
5.2. Application of the Ontology to the Port of Hamburg
In the next subsections we describe some aspects of the Port of Hamburg, addressing a number of
real assets and components related to risk management.
An exhaustive description of such an environment would be quite long and articulated. That is
definitely out of the scope of this paper.
Rather, we focus on the description of a number of selected aspects by adopting the data model
provided. The subset considered shows the intrinsic complexity of the target scenario and, in our
opinion, constitutes a validation for the CoRiMaS model and for its ontological implementation.
5.2.1. Describing Seaports
The Port of Hamburg is the third largest port in Europe and is located in the City State of Hamburg
(Germany). The port is operated in a landlord model as premises are owned to the largest extent by
the responsible Port Authority (https://www.hamburg-port-authority.de/en/) and are leased out to
private companies based on long term contracts.
It is a tidal port that is effected by frequent water level changes with large ships entering
or exiting during high tide. As a universal port, it can handle many different types of cargo.
For processing the cargo, the port possesses terminals for containers, bulk, break bulk, and liquids.
In addition, the port also handles an increasing amount of passengers at its cruise terminals.
The cargo loads are further transported to hinterland destinations using rail, road, or inland waterway
connections. The Port of Hamburg may be defined as a kind of virtual organization composed of
a number of internal stakeholders that play an important role in its daily operational processes,
such as the Hambuger Hafen und Logistik AG [65] (terminal operator), the Hapag–Lloyd AG
(www.hapag-lloyd.com/en/home.html, shipping company) and the Hamburg Port Authority (https:
//www.hamburg-port-authority.de/en/). External stakeholders, such as the Berufgenossenschaft für
Handel und Warenlogistik (https://www.bghw.de/, employee liability insurance) and the Deutsche
Bahn AG (https://www.deutschebahn.com/en, train company), contribute to the overall operations
at the seaport, and have a keen interest in the activities carried out by the internal stakeholders.
The stakeholders at the port of Hamburg follow various regional, national, and supranational
regulations constituting the legal framework. Examples in this context are the International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) and the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Enhancing Port Security (Directive 2005/65/EC).
A formal description of the Port of Hamburg according to the CoRiMaS ontology is reported
in Figure 8. As shown, the vocabulary provided, including concepts and relationships among them,
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allows for a systematic unambiguous description of a complex reality. Such an explicit description
is integrated by the inference capabilities inherent in the ontology. For instance, the stakeholders
listed are automatically classified as internal or external stakeholders depending on the relationships
(CoRiMaS:composedOf or CoRiMaS:contributes in the formal specification) existing between them and
the seaport.
CoRiMaS: SeaPort
CoRiMaS: 
Port_of_Hamburg
CoRiMaS: hasPortType
rdf:Type
CoRiMaS: 
composedOf
CoRiMaS: 
Hamburger_Hafen_un
d_Logistik_AG
CoRiMaS: 
Hapag-LLoyd_AG
CoRiMaS: 
contributes
CoRiMaS: 
Berufsgenossenschaft_Ha
ndel_und_Warenlogistik
CoRiMaS: 
Deutsche_Bahn_AG
CoRiMaS: 
hasFeature
CoRiMaS: 
hasPortLocation
CoRiMaS: 
hasLegalFramework
CoRiMaS: 
Europe
CoRiMaS: 
Germany
CoRiMaS: 
International_Ship 
_and_Port_Facility_ 
Security_Code
CoRiMaS: 
universal_port
CoRiMaS: 
tidal_port
CoRiMaS: 
landlord_port
CoRiMaS: 
container
CoRiMaS: 
Hamburg_Port_Authority
…
CoRiMaS: 
City_State_of_
Hamburg
…
CoRiMaS: 
Directive_2005/65/EC
CoRiM
aS: Region
CoRiMaS: 
SpecializationType
CoRiMaS: 
WaterAccessType
CoRiMaS: 
OrganizationType
CoRiMaS: 
cruise
CoRiMaS: 
bulk
CoRiMaS: 
break_bulk
CoRiMaS: 
liquid
CoRiMaS: TerminalFeature
CoRiMaS: 
HinterlandConnections_feature
CoRiMaS: 
rail
CoRiMaS: 
road
CoRiMaS: 
inland_waterway
Internal Stakeholders
External Stakeholders
rdf:Type
rdf:Type
rdf:Type rdf:Typerdf:Type
Figure 8. Formal description of the Port of Hamburg according to the CoRiMaS ontology.
5.2.2. Describing Stakeholders
Examples of stakeholders are reported in Figure 9.
CoRiMaS: 
StakeholderCategory_byType
CoRiMaS: 
StakeholderCategory_byRole
CoRiMaS: 
StakeholderCategory_byPosition
CoRiMaS: 
landside
CoRiMaS: 
terminal_operator
CoRiMaS: 
container_transshipment
rdf:Type
rdf:Type
rdf:Type
CoRiMaS: 
Hamburger_Hafen_und_Logistik_AG
CoRiMaS: 
Deutsche_Bahn_AG
CoRiMaS: 
hinterland
rdf:Type
CoRiMaS: 
train_company
rdf:Type
CoRiMaS: 
hinterland_transport
rdf:Type
CoRiMaS:
Economic_direct
CoRiMaS:
Private_Company
CoRiMaS: hasStakeholderCategory CoRiMaS: hasStakeholderCategory
rdf:Type rdf:Type
Attributes 
(external vocabularies)
Attributes 
(external vocabularies)
Figure 9. Example of stakeholder description.
The Hamburger Hafen und Logistik AG (HHLA) [65] is an internal stakeholder who engages in
the daily activities at the seaport. It is a privately owned terminal operator that is located at the land
side of the seaport. The company focuses, with its container hubs, on the transshipment of containers,
connecting the seaport with the hinterland economic regions.
The Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) (https://www.deutschebahn.com/en) is an external stakeholder
that is directly linked to the daily economic activities at the seaport. It is a train company, owning and
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operating the largest part of the hinterland railway network. The DB network is connected to the port
by the land side railway connection of the Hafenbahn (eng. Port Railway) which is operated by the
Hamburg Port Authority.
Both stakeholders are described by adopting the standard categorization offered by the ontology.
Indeed, HHLA is declared to be a private company (CoRiMaS:Private_Company) and DB to be an entity
with a direct economic interest in the seaport (CoRiMaS:Economic_direct).
Furthermore, as shown in the diagram, a number of types are dynamically defined by adopting
the rich vocabulary provided and are associated with the stakeholders. For instance, from a
position perspective, the two stakeholders are associated with the types CoRiMaS:landside and
CoRiMaS:hinterland respectively.
5.2.3. Describing Hazards
In the Port of Hamburg, several different hazards have to be considered during daily operations.
For instance, very frequently, incorrect or undeclared dangerous goods from all over the world
represent a critical hazard in the process of cargo handling. As dispatchers and shippers are required
to declare the transported goods truthfully, a violation of this practice is always a conscious act.
Consequently, undeclared dangerous goods can be classified as intentional hazard. The resulting risk
might heavily affect the port community as demonstrated by the case of the “CCNI AURACO” that is
described in the introductory section.
An example of a hazard that might be either intentional or unintentional is the occurrence of an
oil leakage. In most cases, an oil barrel or hydraulic line is not damaged by intention by the responsible
person, although in few others it might have been a wilful act.
Apart from man-made hazards, natural hazards are also a critical source of risk. Storm surge is a
hydrological hazard frequently witnessed in many regions, and in the Port of Hamburg in particular.
Lightning, as an example of metro-logical hazards, is also relevant in most regions and represents
therefore a hazard that needs to be considered.
Regardless of the hazard type, the resulting risk occurrence probability and risk consequence
can be classified into different levels, either by qualitative or quantitative measures. In Hamburg,
different assessment levels are used by the respective internal stakeholders and a commonly accepted
classification does not exist. Here, as an example, we followed the universally applicable levels of
low, medium, and high to assess identified risks. Terminal operators, for instance, follow different
approaches to determine the risk occurrence probability and consequence. For example, dangerous
goods are analysed and evaluated in a risk matrix or other hazard analysis method based on a
designated class for dangerous goods (e.g., class 1: fireworks). A semi-quantitative scale (low-high) for
the occurrence probability and consequence is used, and corresponding values are selected based on
expert knowledge and previous incidents.
Our formal representations are proposed in Figure 10. The examples previously cited are
associated with their respective categories as well as the associated risk occurrence probability and
risk consequence is set as a variable range “low-high”.
5.2.4. Describing Cooperation Aspects
As an example of cooperation aspect, we propose joint exercises on leaking containers, which is
considered one of the most critical cooperation aspects in the Port of Hamburg. It refers to dangerous
goods as man-made hazards, because leakages from such containers represent a severe risk to health
and the environment. As executing entities, internal stakeholders, such as terminal operators and fire
brigades, are involved. In the case of Hamburg, the Hamburg Hafen und Logistik AG [65] receives
support and training from the fire brigade in such exercises to increase their degree of preparedness and
response capabilities. For instance, emergency plans are discussed and simulated in such exercises to
mitigate the consequences of hazardous materials’ leakage from containers. The number of these joint
exercises per year defines the cooperation intensity between the HHLA and the fire brigade. Each joint
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exercise is carefully planned considering different resources and specific scenarios. The joint exercises
on leaking containers are linked to the treatment phase of the dangerous goods management process.
CoRiMas: 
risk_occurrenceProbability
CoRiMaS: 
Intentional_Hazard
CoRiMaS: 
Undeclared_Dangerous_Goods
rdf:Type
“low-high”
CoRiMas: 
risk_consequence
CoRiMas: 
risk_occurrenceProbability
“low-high”
CoRiMaS: 
Oil_Leakage
CoRiMaS: 
Unintentional_Hazard
rdf:Type
rdf:Type
CoRiMas: 
risk_consequence
CoRiMaS: 
Hydrological_Hazard
CoRiMaS: 
Storm_Surge
rdf:Type
“low-high”
CoRiMas: 
risk_consequence
CoRiMas: 
risk_occurrenceProbability
“low-high”
CoRiMaS: 
Metrological_Hazard
CoRiMaS: 
Lightning
rdf:TypeCoRiMas: 
risk_occurrenceProbability
CoRiMas: 
risk_consequence
Figure 10. Example of hazard description.
The ontological representation for the target cooperation aspect is proposed in Figure 11.
As shown, the cooperation aspect (CoRiMaS: Joint_Excercise_on_Leaking_Containers) is related
to the target hazard (CoRiMaS: Dangerous_Goods), to the stakeholders involved (CoRiMaS:
Hamburg_Hafen_ und_Logistik_AG and CoRiMaS: Fire_Brigade in this case), and to process to follow
(CoRiMaS: Dangerous_Goods_Management_Process).
CoRiMaS: 
CooperationAspect
CoRiMaS: aspectRelatedTo
CoRiMaS: 
Joint_Exercises_on_Leaking_Containers
CoRiMaS: 
Dangerous_Goods
CoRiMaS: 
Fire_Brigade
CoRiMas: 
cooperationAspectIntensity
CoRiMaS: relatedToProcess
CoRiMaS: 
Dangerous_Goods_Management_Process
CoRiMaS: Man-made_Hazard
CoRiMaS: 
Hamburger_Hafen_und_Logistik_AG
CoRiMaS:
InternalStakeholder
CoRiMaS: relatedToStakeholder
rdf:Type
rdf:Type
rdf:Type
“number_of_joint_excercises_per_year”
Figure 11. Specification of cooperation aspects.
5.2.5. Describing Processes
A generic management process for dangerous goods normally comprises four main phases:
identification, analysis, evaluation, and treatment. Each phase consists of several activities that need
to be carried out to deliver the intended result to the corresponding phase. Each phase uses specific
methods that allows the successful implementation of the phase activities.
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For risk identification, checklists are used to identify hazards and derive the associated potential
risks. For instance, a standard checklist from the German Chemical Industry Association (Verband der
Chemischen Industrie e. V., VCI ) is used by the HHLA to identify dangerous goods in a container.
In the risk analysis phase, the causes and consequences for a leaking container are identified along
with assessing the risk occurrence probability and consequence. These activities are fulfilled using the
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) method (System Safety Program Requirements, MIL-STD-882c,
1993). PHA is a risk analysis method used to identify potential hazards. It should consider
environmental constraints, hazardous components, and safety-related equipment. The evaluation
phase follows in order to define the evaluation criteria and treatment priorities. The hazard
diamond, also called fire diamond, is presented in the NFPA (704) which is the Standard System
for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response (Standard System for the
Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response, NFPA 704, 2017). The four divisions
of the diamond, health hazard, chemical reactivity, flammability, and special hazards are used by fire
brigades to evaluate hazardous materials as well as to derive the treatment precautions and priorities.
Based on the evaluation phase, the identification and deployment of suitable counter measures are
required in the treatment phase. Additionally, the definition of responsibilities for the deployment of
measures among fire brigades and the HHLA is carried out. A catalogue for hazardous materials and
dangerous goods is used as a method to derive the suitable counter measures based on the evaluation
phase carried out using the HAZARD diamond.
The whole process is formally described by the diagram in Figure 12 as a composition of the
different phases, each of whom is associated with activities and related methods.
CoRiMaS: Dangerous_Goods_Management_Process
CoRiMaS: Process
CoRiMaS: composedOf_ProcessPhase
CoRiMaS: Identification CoRiMaS: Analysis CoRiMaS: Treatment
CoRiMaS: 
previous_phase
CoRiMaS: phase_activity
CoRiMaS: 
Define_Evaluation_Criteria
CoRiMaS: 
Hazard_Diamond
CoRiMaS: Evaluation
CoRiMaS: phase_activity
CoRiMaS: Identify_Hazards
CoRiMaS: 
rm-method
CoRiMaS: 
Checklists
CoRiMaS: 
Identify_Risk_Causes
&Consequences
CoRiMaS: 
Assess_Risk_Occurrence_
Probability&Consequence
CoRiMaS: phase_activity
CoRiMaS: 
Preliminary_Hazard _Analysis CoRiMaS: phase_activity
CoRiMaS: 
Identify_Suitable_Counter_ 
Measures
CoRiMaS: 
Catalogue
CoRiMaS: 
Define_Responsibilities
CoRiMaS: 
Derive_Treatment_Priorities
CoRiMaS: 
Derive_Potential_Risks
CoRiMaS: 
Deploy_Defined_Counter_
Measures
rdf:Type
CoRiMaS: 
previous_phase
CoRiMaS: 
previous_phase
CoRiMaS: 
rm-method
CoRiMaS: 
rm-method
CoRiMaS: 
rm-method
Figure 12. An example of risk management process specification.
6. Applications
As extensively discussed in the paper, CoRiMaS underpins the formal representation of existing
seaports and hazard-related issues. This representation defines a kind of mapping as the function
of types, features, locations, legal frameworks, as well as internal and external stakeholders. Such a
mapping enables in practice a large amount of information within a unique knowledge framework
defined according to a rich data model.
Within that same knowledge framework, risk management processes and cooperation aspects
may be easily defined and formally specified. According to this descriptive approach, specific
methods, countermeasures, tasks, and responsibilities of corresponding internal stakeholders are
linked to the structure of a seaport, corresponding stakeholders, recommended processes, and hazards.
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This enhanced capability in terms of analysis is expected to contribute in the future development of a
more prescriptive model for cooperative risk management in seaports.
More concretely, we consider the application of the ontology at three different levels:
• Data/Knowledge Infrastructure. We believe our ontology may be primarily understood as a
contribution to the development of the Semantic Web.
• Applications within Knowledge-based Systems. We also aim at the application within generic
knowledge-based systems, in which the ontology may contribute to an effective knowledge
management approach [66] in a context wider than the specific risk management. For instance,
internal documents on risk management may be enriched with semantic annotations and can be
linked to other information sources internally as well as externally.
• Expert Systems. The intent and the extent of our ontology is much beyond an unique specific
expert system. Indeed, we designed this knowledge infrastructure having in mind a cutting
edge scenario in which a centralized system is composed by multiple expert systems that are
interconnected by interchanging information and data. We are confident that this philosophy can
meet most practical requirements in the context of a complex virtual organization. It implicitly
enables the interchange of data also across heterogeneous systems and, of course, among different
seaports to provide a further level of analysis and consolidation for processes, methods, and
underlining strategies.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper describes an ontological approach for cooperative risk management in seaports.
The model proposed and its formal specification enable the effective description and re-use of risk
management activities and their related environments, the analysis of current strategies for specific
risks, and the continuous alignment and optimization. Indeed, the complex structure of seaports
requires the definition of clear standards, regulations, processes, roles, and responsibilities.
A case study conducted for the Port of Hamburg was used to validate the developed ontology.
The experiment shows the strong connection among the concept classes defined within the ontology
and the applicability of the defined relationships among the different concepts, as well as the flexibility
of the proposed vocabulary, which relies on extensible and customizable constructs.
The CoRiMaS ontology was developed to be widely applicable and to foster cooperation within
and among seaports. We believe that, if properly used, it may significantly contribute to improve
risk management and, thereby, to increase the resilience of operations within seaports, as well as
the protection of surrounding areas. By focusing on a collaborative approach, we are intrinsically
assuming that common potential conflicts of interest, normally raising within virtual organizations
and related to economic implications, exist, but are not as relevant as the common goal to improve
safety in operations.
Additionally, we consider the descriptive characteristics of the ontological approach to be
potentially helpful in the development of a more prescriptive model for cooperative risk management
in seaports. This will definitely help single stakeholders, as well helping to further encourage
the cooperation among them to improve the management of risks during each phase of the risk
management process.
Current limitations are mainly related to the very limited experimentation; however, our main
contribution is the formal specification of the model. We believe that this formalization of the
framework may facilitate its adoption in practice. A further and deeper validation in the context of
the Port of Hamburg and other seaports will be the object of future work. Such a consolidation phase
is expected to drive the evolution of the core ontology as presented in this paper. As extensively
discussed, the ontology is developed upon semantic technology and, therefore, can provide a solid
support to develop sophisticated knowledge-based systems and, in general, for applications that
require data aggregation, re-use, and interoperability.
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